统计研究

R&D补贴一方面可以弥补研发活动外部性所产生的市场失灵,另一方面容易诱发寻租行为而削弱补贴效率,而关于R&D补贴能否促进TFP提升尚未达成一致。本文从政府和企业互动视角着手构建两阶段动态博弈模型,演绎R&D补贴机制。研究发现,当R&D补贴强度高于某阈值后,容易诱使企业在创新策略选择中发送虚假信号,降低政府R&D补贴效率。本文进一步利用我国省域面板数据检验不同强度R&D补贴对TFP的异质性影响,并探析寻租在R&D补贴与TFP之间的影响路径。实证结果表明,R&D补贴总体上对TFP具有负向影响,且补贴强度越高,负向作用越强;寻租是高额度R&D补贴抑制TFP提升的一个重要渠道。因此,创新政策实施过程中要及时调整对不同创新类型企业的补贴额度,防止长期高强度补贴引发寻租活动,确保企业所获取补贴与其实际需求相一致,有效促进TFP提升。

R&D subsidy may remedy the market dysfunction caused by externality on one aspect, is easy to induce the action of rent-seeking to reduce the efficiency of subsidy. There is no agreement reached on whether the R&D subsidy can promote the escalation of total factor productivity(TFP) or not. This paper constructs a two-stage dynamic game model to relate to a R&D subsidy mechanism from the perspective of interaction between the government and enterprises. It is found that when the intensity of R&D subsidy is higher than certain threshold, it might be easy to seduce the enterprise to emit a false signal in the option of innovation ploys, which reduces the efficiency of government R&D handouts. Furthermore, tests are done on the heterogeneous impacts of various intensities of R&D subsidy on TFP by means of Chinese provincial panel data, and probing for the route of rent-seeking effecting R&D subsidy and TFP. The empirical results show that R&D subsidy in general has a negative effect on TFP, the more the intensity of subsidy, the more the negative effect. The rent-seeking is an important channel for high level R&D subsidy to curb TFP escalation. Therefore, in the process of carrying out innovative policies, the subsidy levels to various innovative enterprises need to be adjusted from time to time to prevent the rent-seeking induced by long-term intensive subsidy. It is essential to ensure the enterprises to obtain what they really need and the TFP to escalate.