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不同于现有研究立足于工具性视角考察创新型城市试点政策的经济效应,本文基于企业创新策略的视角,运用多时点DID方法,考察创新型城市试点建设对企业高质量创新的影响。研究发现,创新型城市试点建设的政策激励显著提升了制造业企业发明专利申请数量,激发了企业进行高质量创新的动力,但对高质量创新长效维护和提升耐力的支撑度尚显不足。在政策性套利普遍存在的情况下,同群效应所导致的创新策略趋同,发明专利价值增值作用有待加强,是导致试点政策对高质量创新长效维护和提升的激励效应不显著的重要原因。作用机制检验结果表明,相较于风险投资和政府补助,来自银行的信贷支持是引导企业更加关注高质量创新长效维护和提升的有效途径。研究结论为重新认识创新型城市试点政策与企业高质量创新的关系提供了新的经验证据,为我国建设金融强国和科技强国提供了政策启示。
Abstract:Different from the existing researches, which are based on the instrumental perspective to examine the economic effects of innovative city pilot policy, this paper uses the multi-point DID method to investigate the impact of innovative pilot city construction on high-quality innovation of enterprises based on the choice of enterprise innovation strategies. The study finds that: first, the policy incentives generated by the pilot construction of innovative cities have significantly increased the number of invention patent applications by manufacturing enterprises and stimulated enterprises to carry out high-quality innovation,but the degree of support for the subsequent long-term maintenance and enhancement of high-quality innovation by enterprises is still insufficient, and this role has a strengthening trend. How to guide enterprises to focus on the subsequent long-term maintenance and enhancement of high-quality innovation,and to guard against the problem of invention patent bubbles is a top priority. Second, the widespread policy-based arbitrage shows the convergence of enterprise innovation strategies caused by the peer effect, and the value-added role in the interaction between the pilot construction of innovative cities and high-quality innovation of enterprises needs to be strengthened, which is an important reason for the insufficient long-term maintenance and enhancement of high-quality innovation. Third, the pilot construction of innovative cities has significant financing effects, but the financing effects from different sources of funds are heterogeneous; credit support from banks is now a more effective way to guide companies to focus on the long-term maintenance and enhancement of high-quality innovation than venture capital and government subsidies. The conclusions of this paper provide new empirical evidence for re-understanding the relationship between innovative city pilot policies and high-quality innovation of enterprises, which in turn provides policy implications for building a financially and technologically strong China.
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(1)鲍莫尔基于创新型企业家在微观经济理论中的缺位,进一步将生产性(建设型)企业家划分为两种类型,即模仿型企业家和创新型企业家。模仿型企业家是从事与现存企业相似业务的企业家,会推动经济向生产可能性边界逼近;创新型企业家则是具有新思路、提供新产品的企业家,会推动生产可能性边界扩张。
(2)苏塞克斯大学科技政策研究所将创新划分为:渐进性创新(Incremental Innovation)、根本性创新(Radical Innovation)、技术系统的变革(Change of Technology System)、技术–经济范式的变更(Change in Techno-economic Paradigm),其中根本性创新主要是指开拓全新领域、有重大技术突破的创新。
(1)中国政府网,网址为https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021–03/17/content_5593521.htm。
(1)参见《太原市建设国家创新型城市试点工作方案实施细则》,网址为https://www.taiyuan.gov.cn/p1/gfxwj/20101222/1057358.html。
(2)参见《南京市争当江苏省产业科技创新中心排头兵和建设国家创新型城市若干政策措施》,网址为https://kjc.njit.edu.cn/__local/E/2D/A1/6836CDCB0552FEBEC5333BB5604_3A694D90_1204E2.pdf。
(1)由于2018年之后国家新增的17个创新型城市试点名单与本研究样本末期较为接近,为保证实证研究准确性,本文实证分析只考虑截至2016年的61个城市(区)的创新型城市试点建设名单。
(2)根据《中国科技统计年鉴》,有效发明专利数指调查单位作为专利权人在报告年度拥有的、经国内外知识产权行政部门授权且在有效期内的发明专利件数。本文有效发明专利数主要来源于CSMAR数据库和国家知识产权局官网(CSMAR数据库网址为https://datahtbprolcsmarhtbprolcom-s.libvpn.zuel.edu.cn/,国家知识产权局官网网址为https://www.cnipa.gov.cn/tjxx/jianbao/year2022/c.html)。
(1)因篇幅所限,多时点PSM-DID、排除智慧城市试点政策和剔除部分样本的稳健性检验结果分别以附表1~2展示,安慰剂检验以附图1~2展示。
(1)网址为https://opendata.pku.edu.cn/dataverse/pkucer。
基本信息:
DOI:10.19343/j.cnki.11-1302/c.2024.12.006
中图分类号:F273.1;F425
引用信息:
[1]滕宇汯,卢现祥.创新型城市试点政策能否有效引导企业高质量创新?——基于同群效应和融资效应的机制分析[J].统计研究,2024,41(12):71-84.DOI:10.19343/j.cnki.11-1302/c.2024.12.006.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金青年项目“创新政策驱动制造业企业取得突破性技术的效应识别、作用机制及优化路径研究”(24CJL049); 中南财经政法大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助“构建高水平科技自立自强的国家创新组织模式研究”(2722024AK001)
2024-12-25
2024-12-25