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本文以我国华北地区开展的地下水超采综合治理试点为准自然实验,基于河北省和内蒙古自治区502个马铃薯种植户的三期微观调查面板数据,运用双重差分与三重差分模型,分析了水资源使用权确权登记及交易与取用水许可管理两项政策对农户节水灌溉行为的影响。结果表明:与施行单一政策的地区相比,在两项改革政策同时施行的地区,农户采取节水灌溉技术的比例显著提高。同时,本文探讨了地下水超采综合治理试点政策促使农户节水的机制,发现:水资源使用权确权登记及交易政策是基于对水权和井权的明晰化促进了节水灌溉技术采纳,而取用水管理政策是基于对灌溉井数量扩张的控制促进了节水灌溉技术采纳。研究显示:要实现农业节水目标,必须综合发挥市场化手段和政府的作用;必须严格控制新打灌溉井,进一步明晰农业灌溉井产权结构,推进村集体所有和共有灌溉井管护机制创新,形成良好治理结构。
Abstract：Based on the quasi-natural experiment of comprehensive governance pilot of groundwater overdraft carried out in North China and 3 periods of plot-level panel data of 502 potato growers randomly selected in Hebei Province and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the impacts of registration and trade of water use rights and water drawing permission on farmers' adoption of water-saving technology are examined through difference-in-difference( DID) and difference-in-difference-in-difference( DDD) approaches. The results indicate that compared with pilot areas with only one policy implemented, pilot areas with both policies implemented simultaneously have a remarkably higher proportion of farmers' adoption of water-saving irrigation technology. Then the paper conducts an econometric analysis on the causal mechanisms of the pilot policy of groundwater overdraft governance inducing farmers' water-saving behavior, and the result shows that farmers' adoption of water-saving technology comes from two channels. On the one hand, the registration and trade of water use rights clarify the property rights of water and bore wells; on the other hand, water drawing permission reduces the construction of irrigation bore wells and exploitation of groundwater. The paper concludes that the market-oriented means and government intervention should be integrated to achieve agricultural water-saving,and it is necessary to limit the number of bore wells strictly and to clarify the ownership of bore wells for a good governance structure with innovated village collective ownership and sharing systems on irrigation bore well management.
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(1)资料来源：国务院批准《华北地区地下水超采综合治理行动方案》[EB/OL].https：//www.sohu.com/a/300925400_698513。
(1)灌溉井及其配套设备也可被称为“地下水灌溉系统（Groundwater irrigation systems）”（王金霞等，2000;Raghunath,1982）。
(1)因篇幅所限，不同节水灌溉技术的灌溉效率情况以附件展示，见《统计研究》网站所列附件。
基本信息:
DOI：10.19343/j.cnki.11-1302/c.2021.04.009
中图分类号:F323.213;TV213.4
引用信息:
[1]马九杰,崔怡,孔祥智,等.水权制度、取用水许可管理与农户节水技术采纳——基于差分模型对水权改革节水效应的实证研究[J].统计研究,2021,38(04):116-130.DOI:10.19343/j.cnki.11-1302/c.2021.04.009.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金重大项目“乡村振兴背景下数字乡村发展的理论、实践与政策研究”（20&ZD164）; 国家自然科学基金项目“数字金融发展在农村金融空间配给缓解和实体经济金融普惠中的作用研究”（71973146）
2021-04-23
2021-04-23
2021-04-23