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绿色信贷政策从信贷供给、规制企业负外部性行为的角度促进企业绿色转型。本文以2009—2023年我国A股上市公司为研究对象，运用动态随机一般均衡模型以及双重差分模型，实证考察绿色信贷政策与污染程度较高企业违约风险之间的关系。研究发现：实施绿色信贷政策会降低高污染企业的债务规模以及长期债务占比但会增加企业贷短长投的行为，同时也会提升高污染企业的违约风险水平，这种现象在非国有企业和无环境投入企业中更为明显。从作用机制分析，随着《绿色信贷指引》的颁布，高污染企业的融资约束、融资成本均显著增加，进而提高企业的违约风险；而随着企业加大环境信息披露力度，企业违约风险呈下降趋势。拓展研究发现，绿色信贷政策与企业违约风险之间存在行业调节效应，即行业漂绿同构行为会强化两者之间的关系，且融资约束越大的企业，其漂绿倾向越高。本文丰富了基于绿色信贷政策视角企业违约风险实证研究，为企业违约风险防控、绿色信贷政策实施提供经验与证据。
Abstract：From credit supply, green credit policy will regulate the negative externalities of enterprises and promote the green transformation of enterprises. This paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2023 as the research object, and uses dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model and difference-in-difference model to study the relationship between green credit policies and the default risk of high-polluting enterprises. The results show that the implementation of green credit policy will reduce the debt scale and long-term debt ratio of high-polluting enterprises, but it will increase the behavior of enterprises to “lend short-term and invest long-term”. There is a risk premium between the implementation of green credit policy and enterprise default risk, and this relationship is more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises and enterprises without environmental investment. From the perspective of transmission mechanism, the implementation of Green Credit Guidelines will increase the degree of financing constraints and financing costs of high-polluting enterprises, thus increasing the default risk of enterprises, and the stronger the degree of corporate information disclosure is conducive the default to risk mitigation. The extended study finds that there is an industry moderating effect between green credit policy and corporate default risk: industrial green washing isomorphic behavior will intensify the impact of green credit policy on enterprise default risk, and the larger the financing constraint, the higher the green washing tendency. This paper enriches the research on enterprise default risk based on the perspective of green credit policy, and provide evidence to prevent and restrain enterprise risk, and to implement the green credit policy.
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(1)若企业具有减排成本和排放成本，则定义为高污染企业，反之则是低污染企业。
(1)因篇幅所限，参数先验分布设定及贝叶斯估计值结果以附表1展示，见《统计研究》网站所列附件。下同。
(2)因篇幅所限，绿色信贷政策冲击对企业违约风险影响以及信贷渠道传导机制的脉冲响应图以附图1~2展示。
(1)关于高污染行业的界定，根据原环境保护部发布的《上市公司环保核查行业分类管理名录》（环办函[2008]373号），将钢铁、化工等16个行业作为高污染行业。
(2)因篇幅所限，环境信息披露赋值表以附表2展示。
(1)因篇幅所限，描述性统计结果以附表3展示。
(2)因篇幅所限，PSM匹配结果以附表4展示。
(3)因篇幅有限，表1控制变量与协变量结果以附表5展示。
(1)因篇幅有限，表2的控制变量以附表6展示。
(2)因篇幅所限，传导机制实证结果以附表7展示。
(1)因篇幅有限，异质性分析结果以附表8展示。
(2)因篇幅所限，绿色信贷政策的动态效应检验图以附图3展示，稳健性检验结果以附表9~11展示。
(3)象征性披露指企业通过定性描述等方式进行披露；选择性披露表示企业会选择披露正面信息，隐藏或者不披露负面信息。
(1)因篇幅所限，漂绿同构指数（TG ）的计算方法以附录1展示。
(2)因篇幅所限，行业漂绿效应和行业漂绿同构效应分析结果以附表12~13展示。
基本信息:
DOI：10.19343/j.cnki.11-1302/c.2025.07.008
中图分类号:X196;F832.4;F832.51
引用信息:
[1]张庆君,陈思.绿色信贷政策与企业违约风险：转型激励还是风险承担？[J].统计研究,2025,42(07):93-105.DOI:10.19343/j.cnki.11-1302/c.2025.07.008.
基金信息:
教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目“强监管防风险视角下债务风险与银行体系双向溢出的机制、监测与防范研究”(24YJA790088)
2025-03-27
2025
2025-04-22
2025-06-30
2025
1
2025-07-25
2025-07-25